School Diversity, School District Fragmentation and Metropolitan Policy

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Background/Context: Over the past several decades, the structure of school segregation has changed significantly. In the past, students from different racial and ethnic backgrounds tended to be separated into different buildings within school districts; increasingly, however, students from different racial and ethnic backgrounds are likely to be separated into entirely separate districts (Clotfelter, 2004). This growing problem of between-district segregation poses a unique set of challenges for districts and policymakers seeking to advance integration, as districts have administrative authority only over policies that cover their own boundaries. The changing configuration of school segregation, therefore, requires a better understanding of, and more creative solutions aimed at, this policy problem.

Focus of Study: This article explores the dilemmas created by between-district segregation and school district fragmentation in terms of efforts to diversify schools. In our analysis, we examine four predominant approaches that have been used in city governance reform to address the problems of municipal fragmentation: annexation, consolidation, mobility programs, and metropolitan governance reform. Within each section, we examine the potential of each of these approaches as a solution to the problems associated with school district fragmentation.

Data Collection and Analysis: We first review existing research to examine what is known empirically about between-district segregation, and the role of school district fragmentation as a contributing factor. We then review literature about policy efforts to address problems caused by fragmentation in noneducational domains.

Conclusions: Each of the policy efforts discussed in this article offer insights as to potential policy directions to improve integration and address the costs of fragmentation. We
INTRODUCTION

Although schools in the U.S. are more racially diverse than ever before, they are also more segregated than at any point in the past 20 years (McArdle, Osypuk, & Acevedo-Garcia, 2010; Orfield, 2009). Today, the average Black and Latino students attend a school that is more than 75% non-White (Orfield, 2009, p.13), and nearly half of these students attend schools with poverty rates over 80%, compared with less than 5% of White students (McArdle et al., 2010, p.16).

While current levels of school segregation are reminiscent of the pre-
Brown era, the configuration of segregation today is fundamentally different. In the past, students from different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds tended to reside within the boundaries of the same school district, but were segregated into separate buildings by school district policies and practices (Clotfelter, 2004). Today, with the growth of metropolitan areas and the expansion of suburban development, students from different racial, ethnic, and economic backgrounds are more likely to reside in separate school districts entirely (Clotfelter, 2004).

Levels of such “between-district” segregation are highest in metropolitan areas in the Northeast and Midwest, which house large numbers of relatively smaller school districts. In such “highly fragmented” metropolitan areas, school district boundaries have been found to exacerbate resource inequality and racial isolation between districts (Bischoff, 2008; Orfield, 2002). Yet, levels of between-district segregation have also been growing in the South and West, as suburban expansion has driven middle-class families out of even larger county-wide school systems (Clotfelter, 2004).

These patterns of segregation are concerning to many educators and policymakers as segregation has been found to impose significant fiscal, social, and academic costs on both students and schools (see Hanushek, Kain, & Rivkin, 2004; Orfield & Lee, 2005). Furthermore, integration has been shown to have important short- and long-term academic and social benefits for students from all racial and ethnic backgrounds (Mickelson & Nkomo, 2012).
The growing problem of between-district segregation poses a unique set of challenges for districts and policymakers seeking to advance school-level integration. The first problem is that districts have administrative authority over policies that cover only their own boundaries, which means that district leaders lack the power to establish cross-district integration policies. The second dilemma is that there are few policy structures in place in most states that allow for, or encourage, cross-district collaboration to address these issues. The changing configuration of school segregation, then, requires a better understanding of, and more creative solutions aimed at, this policy problem.

The goal of this article is to explore the policy dynamics and dilemmas created by between-district segregation and school district fragmentation in terms of efforts to diversify schools. We first review existing research to examine what is known empirically about between-district segregation, and the role of school district fragmentation as a contributing factor. We then examine policy efforts to address problems caused by fragmentation in other (noneducational) domains, and we consider whether such efforts could serve as a potential solution to school district fragmentation. We conclude with policy lessons based upon our examination of these prior efforts.

SCHOOL DISTRICT FRAGMENTATION

According to Weiher (1991), the term fragmentation “refers to the proliferation of governments across American society and geography. It denotes the division of urban areas among hundreds of overlapping, autonomous political units, each with an array of powers” (p. 4). As Weiher (1991) and others note, metropolitan areas vary significantly in terms of the number of different governmental entities within them. For the purposes of this analysis, we focus on the number of school districts within a metropolitan area.

Metropolitan areas vary dramatically in the number of school districts and the corresponding level of school district fragmentation. A “high fragmentation” metropolitan area is typified by a core central city district surrounded by numerous, smaller suburban school districts; a “low fragmentation” metropolitan area, by contrast, is characterized by a large (i.e., countywide) school district incorporating both a central city and its suburbs. One illustrative example of “high” and “low” levels of school district fragmentation is a comparison between the Milwaukee metropolitan area and the Jacksonville metropolitan area, selected because they are comparable in terms of overall student enrollment (see Figure 1) but have differing levels of fragmentation. On the left is the
“high fragmentation” Milwaukee metro, which in 2007 housed 239,900 students across 68 school districts; on the right is the “low fragmentation” Jacksonville metro, which served a comparable number of students (206,400 students) across just seven school districts (Richards, Stroub, & Holme, 2012).

A standardized measure of school district fragmentation has been used by Bischoff (2008), who measured fragmentation with a probability formula, calculated as the likelihood that two students living within a metropolitan area will live in two different districts. In such a conceptualization, fragmentation values can range from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates that all students in a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) attend the same district (i.e., zero fragmentation) and 1 indicates that all students in a MSA attend different districts (i.e., perfect fragmentation). Bischoff found in her sample of 304 MSAs that the average fragmentation value was .72, which meant that there was a 72% probability that two randomly selected students within any given MSA would live in separate school districts (Bischoff, 2008, p. 197). The lowest fragmentation value was the Reno Nevada MSA with a value of .016, indicating that most students within the metro reside within one district (just a 1.6% chance that randomly selected students would reside in separate districts). On the high end was the highly fragmented MSA of Nassau-Suffolk, New York, with a value of .986, which is indicative of the way in which the area’s many small school districts separate students and means that there is a 98.6% chance that two randomly selected students would attend separate districts (Bischoff, 2008, p. 197).
Bischoff found significant regional differences in levels of fragmentation: school district fragmentation levels were higher than the national average in the Northeast (.862) and Midwest (.744), and lower than the average in the West (.691) and the South (.650). These regional differences in school district fragmentation parallel similar regional patterns of municipal fragmentation and are closely linked to state laws. Historically northeastern states have enacted laws that favor the incorporation of suburbs into independent municipalities (and school districts). As a result, these metro areas are often characterized by small central cities and central city school districts, surrounded by many smaller autonomous suburban cities and school districts (Jackson, 1985). Southern and western states, by contrast, have historically had laws that favored the creation of countywide districts (Bischoff, 2008, p. 198; Frankenberg, 2009). The Milwaukee and Jacksonville example, cited previously, illustrates these regional differences: the Milwaukee metro area in the Midwest has a school district fragmentation index of .83, while the Jacksonville metro area in the South has a fragmentation index of just .55 (Richards et al., 2012, p. 9.)

SCHOOL DISTRICT FRAGMENTATION: BENEFITS AND COSTS

A high level of school district fragmentation is not inherently problematic for metropolitan areas (see, e.g., Diamond, 2000). The existence of a large number of smaller school districts can promote greater levels of democratic participation by citizens, who are more likely to become involved when the political sphere is smaller and more immediate (Reynolds, 2003; Weiher, 1991). “Localism,” supporters argue, also promotes a stronger sense of community (see, e.g., Feuerstein, 2002). Such arguments about the benefits of localism have been marshaled in proposals to break up major metro school districts (i.e., the proposal to break up the Los Angeles Unified School District in the 1990s) in which advocates claim that smaller jurisdictions would promote greater involvement by parents and more responsiveness on the part of districts (Harp, 1993).

Others argue that small school districts promote a more efficient provision of public services, as residential “consumers” move to jurisdictions that meet their preferred mixture of taxation and service preferences (Hoxby, 2002; Reynolds, 2003). Supporters of localism also say that small governmental jurisdictions promote what Briffault (1996) terms “territorial community,” or a sense of local identity in which people with similar concerns and values or preferences create a local community, leading to greater community consensus, and thus allocative efficiency in terms of resources, such as school taxing and expenditures (Hoxby, 2002).
Other scholars, however, argue that localism comes with significant political and social costs (Briffault, 1996; Orfield, 2002; Orfield, 2001; Reynolds, 2003). Such costs arise from the existence of the boundaries themselves, which can promote a competitive environment in which some cities are able to gain a competitive advantage by adopting exclusionary policies, i.e., residential zoning prohibiting multi-family housing, that allow them to attract higher income residents who bring higher levels of revenue, while excluding lower income residents (Drier, Mollenkopf, & Swanstrom, 2004; Orfield, 2002). Indeed, Briffault (1996) notes that fragmentation can set off a spiral of stratification within a metropolitan area: “The combination of local control over land use within local borders and local fiscal autonomy . . . sustains a hierarchy of wealth and reinforces the differences in tax burdens and local service quality among localities in most metropolitan areas” (p. 1137).

Fragmentation among jurisdictions also, according to a number of scholars, fuels residential racial segregation (Bischoff, 2008; Briffault, 1996; Orfield, 2002). Bischoff (2008), for example, found that in metropolitan areas with high levels of fragmentation among school districts, residents were more racially segregated from one another at the school district level. This relationship was stronger for Black/White segregation, and present but less strong for Hispanic/White segregation and for Asian/White segregation. She found that while school district boundaries led people to sort themselves into separate school districts, these boundaries had no significant effect on within district-segregation, noting that “as a metropolitan area becomes more politically disjointed, people sort into boundaries that matter for access to goods but segregate less within these meaningful boundaries” (p. 201). She found that school district fragmentation played a more significant role than municipal fragmentation in residential segregation, concluding that “municipal fragmentation has no significant effect on segregation net of school district fragmentation” (p.206, emphasis added).

A number of scholars also counter the efficiency claims made by advocates of localism, arguing that fragmentation in fact “[promotes] wasteful competition and duplication of public services, with too much variation in quality” (Drier et al., 2004, p. 221). Because fragmentation encourages affluent municipalities to drive up costs within their localities, it tends to push middle class families seeking better housing away from the city to the urban fringe where housing costs are lower—thus promoting sprawl (Drier et al., 2004). These “spillover effects” of decisions by some governments can create costs for other governments. Some also argue that fragmentation can hurt affluent residents within metropolitan areas by depressing the overall economic health of a region. As Briffault (1996) notes:
In the short run, residents of more affluent localities may benefit, in terms of lower taxes and higher quality services, from the local-boundary-based structures of metropolitan areas. In the long run, however, interlocal competition, interlocal wealth disparities, and the resulting inferior services and infrastructure in central cities can bring down the economic base of the region as a whole, making affluent areas as well as poorer ones less well-off than they might have been had the region as a whole invested more in poorer localities. (p. 1140)

Some also question the “allocative efficiency” of multiple jurisdictions, noting that housing discrimination and lending discrimination can interfere with such market efficiencies (Drier et al., 2004).

Some also argue that political fragmentation undermines the democratic polity by creating a sense of alienation, separation, and even fear (Frug, 2002). Indeed, Oliver (2001) found, fragmentation and segregation can lead to lower levels of political participation overall. Some scholars note that the jurisdictional boundaries create social and political divisions that can undermine support for policies that may be beneficial for the region as a whole, such as controls on sprawl (Drier et al., 2004; Frug, 2002).

In sum, jurisdictional fragmentation can impose significant political, economic, and social costs on individuals, communities, and school districts. Yet, understanding the effects of school district fragmentation on segregation and opportunity for students can be particularly complex, as we discuss below.

THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MUNICIPAL AND SCHOOL DISTRICT FRAGMENTATION

When considering the consequences of school district fragmentation on opportunity for students, it is important to understand the relationship between school district fragmentation and the fragmentation levels of the city in the metropolitan area in which districts are located. This is because many policies that are adopted by cities have a direct bearing on the fiscal health of school districts, such as land use policies, zoning policies, and taxation. Such policies have a significant effect on school districts, even as school district leaders often have little, if any, input on those policies themselves.

The relationship between school district fragmentation and city (municipal) fragmentation is rarely direct because school district boundaries and municipal boundaries do not always perfectly overlay one another (Fischel, 2010). Fischel (2010) studied the correlation between municipal
and school district boundaries in 661 metropolitan areas. He found that in approximately one-quarter (24%) of the metropolitan areas studied, the boundaries were the same. School districts were more likely to be coterminous with city boundaries in the upper midwestern states and the Northeast—differences that relate, as stated previously, to state laws. In about one-fifth of cases (21%), Fischel found that the major central city districts (particularly in the South and West) were larger (often countywide) and served more than one municipality. An example of this type of relationship is the Los Angeles Unified School District, which serves 27 municipalities within its 710 square mile border.\(^3\) In 13% of the metropolitan areas, Fischel found, municipalities were served by more than one school district. This type of situation often occurs when a central city has been able to annex territory, while the central school district boundaries have remained unchanged. Such was the case in the city of Indianapolis, Indiana: while the Indianapolis city boundaries cover 361 square miles, the Indianapolis School District only covers 79 square miles (US Census, 2011). Similarly, the boundaries of the San Jose Unified School District in northern California cover 49.7 square miles,\(^4\) while the city of San Jose, as a result of significant annexations in the 1960s, has much larger boundaries at 177 square miles (US Census, 2011).

The relationship between municipal boundaries and school district boundaries has a direct bearing on levels of school segregation and on the fiscal condition of urban school districts, in particular. In cases where the school district boundaries are large and incorporate both a core central city as well as suburban municipalities (i.e., countywide districts like Wake County, incorporating the city of Raleigh and a number of surrounding suburban municipalities), school districts are more likely to have a greater diversity of students and have a more robust tax base from which to draw. By contrast, in cases where central cities are served by more than one school district (i.e., where the school district territory is smaller than the city territory, such as in San Antonio) the central city school districts are less likely to include suburban development, and thus likely to be more racially isolated, with greater levels of student need, and with a lower tax base than the city in which it is embedded. When boundaries are the same, the fate of the cities, suburbs, and districts are intimately tied, for better or worse.

OVERCOMING FRAGMENTATION THROUGH METROPOLITAN REFORM

Concerns about the social and fiscal costs associated with fragmentation have motivated a number of policymakers and scholars to propose solutions that break down or reduce the significance of, school district and
municipal boundaries. In the following discussion, we examine four predominant approaches that have been used in city governance reform to address the problems of municipal fragmentation: annexation, consolidation, mobility programs, and metropolitan governance reform. Within each section, we examine the potential of each of these approaches as a solution to the problems associated with school district fragmentation.

ANNEXATION

The earliest strategy used by cities to address geopolitical fragmentation was the use of powers of annexation. Annexation, as Orfield (2002) writes, is “the power granted to cities in some states to expand their boundaries to capture undeveloped land, unincorporated areas, or existing communities” (p. 133). Annexation was a tool employed by most major U.S. cities in the 19th century (Frug, 2002; Jackson, 1985); during this time period, cities were given the power to annex land through highly favorable state laws that allowed annexations to occur over the objections of suburban residents (Frug, 2002; Jackson, 1985).

Over time, however, suburbanites began to more strongly resist annexation efforts by cities (Jackson, 1985). As Frug (2002) notes, “Then, as now, many suburban residents vehemently opposed annexation because they wanted to defend local control, avoid taxes, or gain access to better city services; then, as now, suburban residents sought to isolate themselves from the kind of people central cities attracted” (p.1767). Suburban opposition to annexation was bolstered by state laws, common in northeastern and midwestern states, which favored suburban incorporation and made annexation more difficult (Jackson, 1985). As a result, annexations by central cities declined after World War I (Vogel & Harrigan, 2007, p. 270).

Trends have been somewhat different in the southern and western United States, where state laws have been relatively more favorable to annexation. Texas, for example, has had a “Home Rule Law,” which gives its large cities relatively liberal annexation authority. The city of San Antonio used this authority to expand from just 70 square miles in 1950, to 184 square miles by 1970, to 461 square miles in 2010 (US Census, 2011). Houston similarly expanded its total land area by 270% during this time period, expanding from 160 square miles in 1950 to 600 square miles in 2010 (US Census, 2011).

Annexation has helped core cities maintain a strong tax base by enabling them to capture a significant proportion of metropolitan population growth. As of 2010, Houston still housed 35% of the metro population and San Antonio controlled an even greater 62% (US Census, 2011). By contrast, cities unable to annex—like Detroit and Minneapolis—housed
much lower proportions of their metro’s populations, in this case 17% and 11%, respectively.

Annexation efforts have slowed in recent years as a result of two inter-related trends. One is the fast pace of suburbanization and ensuing suburban incorporation, which has led to greater resistance on the part of suburbs against annexation (Frug, 2002; Orfield, 2002). The other has been the complaint from communities of color that annexation dilutes minority influence on city government (Frug, 2002; Vogel & Harrigan, 2007). Despite this decline, annexation has been an important policy tool in improving the financial, as well as demographic, situation of core cities.

While annexation has helped a number of cities improve their fiscal and demographic position, annexation has not yielded the same types of benefits for urban school districts located in those same cities. Under most state laws, the boundaries of urban districts are not permitted to expand along with city annexations; as a result, school district territory of urban districts can be much smaller in size than the city in which it is located. The San Antonio metro, as mentioned previously, is a good example of these dynamics: while the city of San Antonio was able to annex territory and expand to 461 square miles by 2010, the boundaries of San Antonio Independent School District have remained 79 square miles, covering 17% of the city’s territory. Similarly, Houston Independent School District (at 301 square miles) currently serves just 50% of the city of Houston’s territory.

Urban districts in such contexts, therefore, must cope with relatively weaker tax bases, and higher levels of segregation than the city in which they are located. In such contexts, urban districts, such as San Antonio, are left with the challenging task of maintaining facilities and infrastructure on a declining tax base; they often are required to tax themselves at higher rates to yield an equitable (or lower) amount of capital funding for infrastructure (Davis & Arsen, 2008; Filardo, Cheng, Allen, Bar, & Ulsoy., 2010). Furthermore, while school finance equity policies in some states address inequities in nonfacilities funding, policies that ensure “equity” can be inadequate in that they do not address the higher resources needed for districts to serve high numbers of students in need (Orfield, 2002). While some gentrification has helped the fiscal state of these urban districts, the in-migration of middle class residents has not changed the concentration of poverty in schools in those contexts (Orfield, 2002).

CONSOLIDATION

Another way that policymakers have attempted to cope with the problems of fragmentation between cities and suburbs is through the consolidation of city and suburban governments into one metropolitan
government. By joining cities with outlying suburbs in one legislative effort, consolidation instantly achieves what annexation efforts attempt to achieve gradually. Orfield (2002) notes that “By combining several independent municipalities into one local government, consolidation can help to eliminate wasteful competition between individual cities, promote coordinated land-use and transportation planning, avoid duplication of public services, and efficiently provide capital-intensive infrastructure and services” (p. 136).

Consolidation efforts were successfully undertaken in a number of metropolitan areas around the turn of the 19th century, in such major cities as New Orleans, Philadelphia, Denver, and New York (Vogel & Harrigan, 2007). Municipal government consolidations have been relatively rare since then, as suburban voters increasingly have opposed such efforts (Judd & Swanstrom, 2000; Orfield, 2002). In fact, just four successful mergers have occurred between city and county governments in major metropolitan areas (i.e., population greater than 250,000) since the 1950s: Indianapolis/Marion County (1969), Jacksonville/Duval County (1967), Nashville/Davidson County (1962), and Louisville/Jefferson County (2003). Two of the mergers—Jacksonville and Nashville—also entailed the merger of the school systems. The Louisville city/county merger, approved in 2000, took place several decades after the city and county school systems were merged by a federal court in an effort to integrate schools. The Indianapolis/Marion County merger of city governments did not involve schools, and, as a result, the 11 separate school systems in this metropolitan area were left intact (Powell, 2000).

Consolidation efforts have also been undertaken with respect to school districts, but the majority of such consolidations have historically occurred in rural areas in an effort to improve the efficiency across local educational agencies. These efforts typically occurred in the mid-20th century: according to the U.S. Civil Rights Commission (1977), between 1932 and 1972, more than 86% of the country’s school districts were eliminated through consolidation and reorganization.

However, in addition to rural consolidations, there have been a handful of school district consolidation efforts in major metropolitan areas in order to explicitly address the tax base and segregation problems stemming from school district fragmentation. Several of these consolidations resulted from court orders to promote integration. The first court-ordered merger of city and suburban school systems occurred in Kentucky in 1975, when a federal court ordered the consolidation of the Louisville and Jefferson County public school systems (Botkins, 2001). The merger united the racially mixed Louisville schools and largely White Jefferson County School Systems, and the court order instituted a mandatory
desegregation plan for the new countywide district (Botkins, 2001; Diem, 2012). Mandatory busing continued until the system was declared unitary in 2000, at which point the district adopted a voluntary integration plan relying on a controlled parental choice program that incorporated the use of race as a factor in student assignment in an effort to maintain racially diverse schools. In 2007, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1 that the plan’s reliance on race was unconstitutional. The district has since redesigned its plan to rely on geography as a way of assigning students and diversifying its schools (Diem, 2012).

The second court-ordered consolidation of city and suburban districts occurred in Delaware in 1978, when a federal court ordered the Wilmington School District (85% Black at the time) be consolidated with 10 almost entirely White school districts in the surrounding New Castle County (Raffel, 2003). In 1981, the state legislature responded to accusations that the district was too large by dividing the district into four pie-shaped school districts—each with some level of racial diversity. The four districts, which remained under court oversight, were declared unitary in 1995 (Delaware Department of Education, 2004; Raffel, 2003).

Some mergers between city and suburban schools have been undertaken voluntarily. For example, the 1960 consolidation of poorer and more racially diverse Charlotte City Schools and more affluent and less racially diverse Mecklenburg County Schools occurred with the consent of voters (www.cms.k12.nc.us). While the merged Charlotte-Mecklenburg school system provided a more robust tax base for downtown Charlotte and more potential for racial integration, the district still maintained racially separate schools. In 1969, a district court judge ordered Charlotte-Mecklenburg to desegregate its schools, a decision that was affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1971 (Orfield, Eaton, & The Harvard Project, 1996.). The district was declared “unitary” in 2000 (Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools).

Another voluntary merger between city and county schools occurred in metropolitan Raleigh, North Carolina. This merger between the city of Raleigh and the Wake County school system occurred in 1976 with the passage of state legislation, at the behest of many educational leaders and the business community (Wake Education Partnership, 2006). The consolidated Wake County Schools subsequently desegregated its schools under court order until 1982, when it achieved unitary status. More recently, it has operated a voluntary integration effort using race, and later socioeconomic status to integrate schools, though this plan was recently dismantled. (It may be revived by a newly elected school board according to Hui, 2012.) A similar effort was undertaken in 1992 in Durham
County, North Carolina. That year, the county commissioners voted to merge the Durham City (largely non-White) and Durham County (mostly White) schools. The vote was argued to be a means to reduce inefficiencies and “prevent the division along racial or economic lines that characterized the Durham school systems” (Anderson, 2011, p. 414). Today, however, the schools remain racially isolated.

The most recent effort to consolidate city and county school systems is being waged in Memphis, Tennessee. In December of 2010, school board members from Memphis City Schools (a predominately Black and property-poor urban district), fearing their revenue would be reduced by the newly elected conservative legislature, voted to surrender their charter to the state (Dillon, 2011; McMillin, 2012). This move effectively dissolved the school district, merging the Memphis City schools into the predominately White, middle-class Shelby County school system—the county in which it is embedded. The merger is being phased in, with the new 23-member school board meeting to plan curricula and staff transitions currently (Dillon, 2011). There are currently no reported plans to use the merger to diversify the schools. While the merger is slated to take full effect in August of 2013 (Dries, 2012), in the summer of 2012 six suburban communities within Shelby County voted to incorporate their own school systems to avoid the consolidation (Bailey & McMillin, 2012).

School district consolidations have had mixed results in terms of equity and opportunity. Some reported benefits of school district consolidation include increased efficiency and increased resources (Anderson, 2011). However, consolidation efforts may suffer from significant drawbacks. First, these efforts do not always include strategies to reduce racial isolation within the newly merged system; thus, some of the merged school systems are characterized by high levels of segregation (see, e.g., Anderson, 2011). Second is the issue of representation: consolidation between city and suburbs (school districts or governments) has the potential to dilute minority voting power, and thus reduce minority voice in school district decisions (Orfield, 2002). Third, in some metropolitan areas, population growth has spilled over county lines, which means that the merged school systems do not necessarily incorporate all of the metropolitan population. This “escape route” can undermine the goals of consolidation in terms of both resources and diversity.

MOBILITY PROGRAMS ACROSS JURISDICTIONAL BOUNDARIES

Some policymakers have sought to address a key problem associated with municipal fragmentation—residential segregation—by moving individual families across jurisdictional boundaries. While these strategies focus on promoting mobility across boundary lines, they do not attempt
to change boundaries or the underlying dynamics of fragmentation. As such, these types of policies do not address the causes of fragmentation, but primarily target the symptoms. Mobility programs have been attempted to address both housing and school segregation, and we discuss each below, in turn.

**Housing Mobility Programs**

Residential mobility programs have aimed to address geographic segregation by altering segregated housing patterns, primarily by relocating low-income residents out of segregated neighborhoods into less segregated, higher-opportunity neighborhoods, often (though not always) across city boundary lines. One of the more notable of these efforts was the Gautreaux program, a housing mobility program that resulted from a 1966 housing discrimination lawsuit against the Chicago Housing Authority and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (Yinger, 1995). The settlement resulted in a program that gave housing vouchers to low-income African American families to move to lower poverty, more integrated neighborhoods (Duncan & Zuberi, 2006). The evaluation of outcomes from this program—known as Gautreaux One—found that families who moved through this program had better social, employment, and academic outcomes for children than those who remained behind (Drier et al., 2004; Yinger, 1995).

Based on these promising findings from Gautreaux, the federal government authorized a similar housing mobility program in 1992 called the Moving to Opportunity Program (MTO), which was administered by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development. The program enrolled families from Chicago, Boston, New York, Baltimore, and Los Angeles from 1994 to 1998, and gave them housing vouchers designed to move them into low-income neighborhoods (Duncan & Zuberi, 2006; Orr et al., 2003; Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011). Findings from the final MTO evaluation compared three groups of families: the MTO movers who were assisted in finding housing in a low-poverty neighborhood; a control group receiving no vouchers; and Section 8 voucher recipients who were able to move anywhere in the private rental market. Results from a 10-year longitudinal study of MTO voucher recipients found health gains, but no gains in terms of employment or education (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011). These mixed results, evaluation authors speculated, stemmed from the fact that many of the voucher recipients ultimately ended up returning to relatively high-poverty neighborhoods (Sanbonmatsu et al., 2011). In order to explore this possibility, Turner, Nichols, and Comey (2012) conducted a re-analysis of only those MTO families that moved to “high opportunity” neighborhoods, which they defined as those census...
tracts with poverty rates below 15%, employment rates above 60%, college graduation rates above 20%, proportion of non-Hispanic Whites greater than 70%, and where more than 200,000 low-wage jobs were located within five miles. They found strong positive effects of MTO, similar to the findings of the earlier Gatreaux program: adults experienced higher levels of employment, health, and income compared to the control group; they also found that the children had higher educational attainment and (for boys only) health outcomes (Turner, Nichols, & Comey, 2012).

It is important to point out that mobility programs like MTO only attack segregation through one-way movement of families of color living in high-poverty neighborhoods into integrated (and ideally low-poverty) neighborhoods, which puts the burden of addressing segregation primarily on those families. Improving high-poverty communities, or thoughtfully integrating communities of color, are not explicit goals of these programs (Vigdor, Massey, & Rivlin, 2002). While some scholars have argued that gentrification is leading to the integration of such communities with beneficial results (Vigdor et al., 2002), gentrification is a market-based phenomenon and is not a coherent policy strategy aimed at increasing integration.

School Mobility Programs

Mobility strategies have also been used to achieve greater levels of school integration through either mandatory busing or voluntary choice. Early school desegregation cases were focused on ending de jure segregation in southern school districts. Because southern school districts were often large—incorporating entire counties—desegregation in such contexts was highly effective because middle class and White flight out of the district was not possible (Clotfelter, 2004).

Later court rulings helped tackle the problem of “de facto” segregation practiced by school districts outside the South. However, the fragmented structure of school districts in many metropolitan areas, particularly in the Northeast and Midwest, created barriers to meaningful integration. In these fragmented contexts (i.e., Detroit, Cleveland, and Milwaukee), Whites were able to insulate themselves from court orders—which often covered only a single district—by moving to the suburbs. Efforts to address such “between-district” segregation through metropolitan remedies were significantly curtailed by the Milliken v. Bradley decision in 1974, in which a closely divided U.S. Supreme Court ruled that cross-district metropolitan remedies were legally impermissible absent a finding of intentional state discrimination (Orfield, 1995; Orfield et al., 1996). As a result, segregation relating to fragmentation has proven more difficult to remedy.
While Milliken limited the potential for mandatory inter-district remedies, in nine metropolitan areas choice-based inter-district desegregation policies have been adopted, and are currently operational in eight: Minneapolis, MN; East Palo Alto, CA; St. Louis, MO; Rochester, NY; Hartford, CT; Boston, MA; Milwaukee, WI; and Omaha, NE. Three of these plans were the result of federal court orders, three were the result of state court rulings, and three were supported by state legislation (Wells et al., 2009). While most of these programs involve one-way transfers of students out of cities and into the suburbs, some programs include interdistrict magnet schools that draw students from across a metropolitan area (Wells et al., 2009). Most of the programs involve a small proportion of children, ranging from 500 in Rochester (Crane, White, Finnigan, & Hylton, 2012), to 5,800 in St. Louis and 7,000 in Hartford (One Nation Indivisible, 2012). While some evidence from the various plans have suggested a positive impact on student performance and racial attitudes, Wells et al. (2009) suggest that without state and federal intervention and support, these policies are not likely to “inspire” suburban districts to help to reduce the segregation of minority and low-income students in inner cities. In fact, one recent study found that differing (and competing) views as to the purpose of inter-district desegregation resulted in greater emphasis on increasing access to high-quality educational programs for a small number of students of color than on integrated schools (Finnigan & Scarbrough, 2013).

Some argue that school choice policies—such as charter schools, vouchers, intra-district open enrollment, inter-district choice, magnet schools, and NCLB choice—can help to accomplish integration by liberating students from the confines of neighborhood attendance boundaries. However, several of these policies (NCLB, intra-district open enrollment, and vouchers) offer students only choices of schools within their home school district (Holme & Wells, 2008). As such, they do little to help students overcome segregation created by school district fragmentation. Furthermore, with the exception of magnet schools, such policies bank on “market forces,” allowing students to freely choose between schools with no controls for diversity. The preponderance of evidence suggests that free-market choice policies stratify, rather than integrate, by race and social class (see Holme & Wells, 2008.)

“NEW REGIONALISM” AND METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE

With a recognition of the political challenges involved in annexation and consolidation, and the inability of mobility strategies to address the core dynamics that drive residential and school segregation, some
policymakers and scholars have devised alternative metropolitan governance solutions to address the inequities and inefficiencies stemming from fragmentation (see, e.g., Briffault, 1996; Frug, 2002; Orfield, 2002). Such regionalist proposals involve efforts to “create effective metropolitan governments or ensure that all local governments are pursuing common policies that will foster fiscal integration that is rationally related to collective needs” (Powell, 2000, p. 228).

As Reynolds (2003) notes, such “new regionalist” approaches “[look] for regional answers to metropolitan area inequalities through a lens that is tempered with the pragmatic realization that proposals to eliminate existing local government units are unlikely to succeed” (p. 112). These regional reform proposals are diverse in structure and scope, ranging from “limited, single-purpose activities . . . through multipurpose cooperative arrangements, to full-fledged regional governments” (Drier et al., 2004, p. 226). Yet they each share a concern with reducing inefficiencies, promoting equity, and advancing the fiscal and social health of regions.

Below, we discuss some of these “new regionalist” policy approaches to address problems of municipal fragmentation. This discussion is divided into three sections: limited voluntary cooperation, regional governance, and federated regionalism. Within each section, we first discuss the existing strategy used to address municipal fragmentation; we then consider parallel arrangements (if any) that currently exist with respect to school districts; and we finally evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of each vis-à-vis the potential of the particular strategy to address problems associated with school district fragmentation.

**Limited Voluntary Cooperation: Inter-local Agreements**

Some scholars and policymakers have argued that many of the inefficiency problems stemming from city (or municipal) fragmentation can be addressed through voluntary cooperation and coordination between two or more local governments within a metropolitan area (Briffault, 1996; Frug, 2002). These voluntary arrangements tend to focus on efficiency in service provision, rather than equity (Frug, 2002, p. 1781). As Briffault (1996) observes, “By enabling localities to pool their resources and provide or receive services beyond their borders, inter-local agreements and joint ventures reduce the significance of local boundaries” (p. 1144).

One common arrangement is a voluntary “inter-local” agreement, which is “entered into by two or more local governments, and they provide an alternative mechanism to address the same kinds of issues” (Frug, 2002, p. 1781). An inter-local agreement may be created between state or local governmental agencies (i.e., to engage in cooperative purchasing to secure discounts on high-volume purchases) or between different
levels of agencies within a state (i.e., a state government might agree to pay fees to a local city fire department for the provision of fire protection on state buildings).

Voluntary inter-local agreements are often employed by school districts as a strategy for pooling resources to gain access to services, often at a reduced cost. Some such agreements are small-scale, such as cooperation for the creation of an alternative school for at-risk youth (Miller, 2009); others are larger scale, such as the inter-local between the Detroit City School District and the Board of Regents of Eastern Michigan University, creating a separate agency called the “Education Achievement Authority” to operate the bottom 5% of Detroit’s public schools.15 Many school districts enter into inter-local agreements for services provided by the “regional service centers” established as special service districts, in which districts contract for support services, e.g., for instructional support, technical support, or professional development. These centers are often funded out of a mixture of federal, state, and local resources (Stephens & Keane, 2005).

Inter-local agreements, supporters argue, enable localities (either cities or school districts) to coordinate planning and more efficiently provide services, while preserving the benefits of localism by allowing local residents to retain control over resources and services (Reynolds, 2003). Inter-locals have, however, been critiqued because they focus on service issues (fire, police, or textbook purchasing), and, as a result, tend to leave the unequal distribution of opportunities or resources untouched (Briffault, 1996; Frug, 2002). Indeed, some argue that voluntary agreements perpetuate the problems of fragmentation by letting local jurisdictions “off the hook,” allowing them to maintain some level of insularity from social and fiscal problems in the region. As Reynolds (2003) argues, “voluntary region-wide cooperative efforts may improperly remove an incentive to meaningful regional burden sharing and may facilitate the ongoing off-loading of metropolitan burdens onto the less affluent segments of metropolitan areas” (p. 123). Similarly, Frug (2002) contends that “the most significant problem that voluntary agreements pose lies in their contribution to the perpetuation of the current, fragmented system of local government authority” (p. 1785; see also Altshuler, Morrill, Wolman, & Mitchell, 1999 and Reynolds, 2003).

Regional Governance: The Use of Voluntary Councils

Given the relative weaknesses of inter-local agreements to deal with problems of fragmentation, scholars and policymakers have argued for the need for more comprehensive metropolitan-wide governing arrangements between municipalities (see, e.g., Briffault, 1996; National
A major type of regional governance structure that has emerged in the late 20th century has been “Councils of Governments” (COGs), which are “a voluntary association of local municipalities and counties that join forces for the purposes of coordinating their activities concerning regional problems” (Vogel & Harrigan, 2007, p. 306). COGs first emerged in the 1950s in response to federal legislation requiring that planning grants be made to regional organizations that consisted of representatives of an area’s political jurisdictions (Orfield, 2002, p. 142), requirements that were strengthened in 1965 by federal housing legislation, and in 1966 by Model Cities legislation (Orfield, 2002).

Over the next several decades, COGs increased in number as federal grants to such councils became available for regional planning (Briffault, 1996; Vogel & Harrigan, 2007). According to Vogel and Harrigan (2007), in 1957 there were fewer than 10 COGs in the country, by 1972 there were more than 300, and by 1980 there were 660 (Vogel & Harrigan, 2005, p. 308). One major factor behind the growth of COGs in the 1980s was the 1973 Federal Highway Act, which created funding for urban mass transit, and, for the first time, authorized federal funding for Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) in every metro area with more than 50,000 residents (Orfield, 2002, p. 144). Many COGs were designated as MPOs for their regions. They were strengthened in 1991 by federal transportation funding, which required that urban areas had a designated MPO for creating regional transportation plans (Vogel & Harrigan, 2007). As a result of this authority, MPOs are, as Orfield (2002) notes, “the most widespread form of regional governance in the United States today” (p. 137).

MPOs and COGs provide a mechanism for coordinating and planning on a regional level (Orfield, 2002), but, as currently structured, their power to address regional issues is limited. First, most are structured by appointment rather than election of members, and thus are not directly accountable to the public. Second, representation on MPOs/COGs tends not to be proportionate to representation in the population, but rather by jurisdiction, leaving cities under-represented (Altshuler et al., 1999). Third, as voluntary associations, they often shy away from controversial issues for fear that members may pull out of the organization (Altshuler et al., 1999; Vogel & Harrigan, 2007). Fourth, their authority in most places is relatively limited, centering primarily on transportation (Orfield, 2002). Despite such weaknesses, Orfield (2002) notes that MPOs/COGs have the potential for greater significance in metropolitan planning and promoting regional equity.
The closest parallel to CGOs and MPOs in education is the governance councils for the inter-district desegregation programs described above. While these councils were designed primarily as a means to oversee inter-district plans, in practice such councils are one of the few forums in which school district representatives (superintendents or school board members) come together across metropolitan areas to address the dual problems of fragmentation and segregation, as well as engage in some level of service provision (Holme et al., 2012). These programs are significant given their power to set policy with respect to inter-district desegregation programs; however, like MPOs and COGs, they suffer from a number of problems (see Holme et al., 2012). First, most council members are not elected, and as a result, they are not required to elicit public input and are not subject to significant public oversight. Second is the problem of proportional representation: most governing boards consist of one representative per school district, which can leave districts with more population (particularly large urban districts) with less voice. (One exception is the St. Louis board, which has structured voting so that votes are weighted according to the proportion of total transfer students received). Third is the voluntary nature of these arrangements, as controversial issues may be shied away from for fear of pushing members out. Finally, with the exception of the Omaha board (discussed later), the programs have no authority beyond the inter-district transfer programs: they don’t address other fragmentation-related inequities, such as the redistribution of revenue to member districts.

**Federated Regionalism: Stronger Authority**

In two metropolitan areas, Portland (Oregon) and Minneapolis-St. Paul (Minnesota), local leaders have sought to overcome the weaknesses of MPOs and CGOs in addressing municipal fragmentation by instituting stronger forms of regional governance. In both of these metros, state legislatures and leaders have “vested significant and comprehensive planning powers in a single regional entity” (Orfield, 2002, p. 119).

Portland is significant in that leaders there have established the nation’s first “directly elected regional governing body”: The Metro Council was authorized by legislation in 1977, and approved by voters in 1978, to address growing problems related to regional fragmentation (Drier et al., 2004, p. 236). The “Metropolitan Service District” (“Metro”) is governed by a seven-member board, consisting of six nonpartisan members elected for four-year terms from single member districts (districts equal in population), as well as an at-large seventh member with veto power (Altshuler et al., 1999; Drier et al., 2004; Vogel & Harrigan, 2007, p. 319). Metro, which serves 24 cities and three counties, was granted
operational responsibilities (e.g., providing waste disposal and operating the zoo) as well as policy-making authority (e.g., transportation and fair-share housing) (Drier et al., 2004; Vogel & Harrigan, 2007). With the approval of voters, Metro has the power to levy sales tax, income tax, and property tax (Drier et al., 2004; Vogel & Harrigan, 2007). Metro, however, has been able to address the service provision and efficiency problems of fragmentation far more effectively than it has been the social inequities of the metropolitan area (see Briffault, 1996).

The Twin Cities Metropolitan Council or “Met Council,” which covers the seven-county Minneapolis-St. Paul metropolitan area, was authorized by state legislation in 1967 and consists of 17 governor-appointed members who set policy guidelines for land use, housing, sewage, and parks (Drier et al., 2004; Orfield, 2002). The “Met Council” functions largely as a “planning and policy-making body rather than as an operating agency” (National Academies, 1999, p. 109). The Twin Cities have also adopted the nation’s first tax-base sharing plan, which requires each jurisdiction in a seven-county area to contribute 40% of the growth in the value of its commercial/industrial tax capacity since 1971 to a regional pool. Such plans, Orfield (2002) observes, are more effective at equalizing local resources than state aid plans.

Taken together, these regional governance efforts have accomplished what Powell calls “federated regionalism,” which “requires entities within a metropolitan region to cooperate on some levels and leaves them relatively autonomous on others” (p. 233). As Powell notes, however, “the ideal balance between local and regional control will hinge upon recognition of the concerns of communities of color, which require regional approaches to address concentrations of poverty and local approaches to address the need for political and cultural empowerment” (p. 242, emphasis added).

The one metropolitan area where “federated regionalism” has been tried in education is the Omaha metropolitan area in Nebraska. In 2007, state legislators, in an effort to resolve a school district boundary dispute, passed legislation creating the “Metro Area Learning Community.” The legislation contained a number of important components that help to address school district fragmentation, and the related problems of tax base inequality and racial segregation (Holme, Diem, & Mansfield, 2011). First, the legislation established a metro-wide governance council consisting of 18 elected members, who were elected through six subcouncils apportioned according to population, through limited voting, which was designed to increase minority representation. School districts failing to win representation in the general election are allowed to join together to appoint a total of three school board members with nonvoting power.
The council, therefore, is elected with proportional representation; it also has the authority to set policy on an inter-district integration plan that is designed to increase socio-economic diversity in schools in the metro area (Holme et al., 2011). The legislation also created a tax-base sharing plan for the 11 school districts in the metro area, and gave the governance council the authority to both set and levy taxes. By striking a balance between regional equity goals and local autonomy, the Learning Community is structured much like the federated regionalist structures of Metro and the Met Council.

Regional efforts like those discussed above help to address problems of fragmentation in relatively more effective ways than loosely coordinated voluntary structures like CGOs, MPOs, and inter-district desegregation governance boards. However, federated arrangements like the Learning Community have inherent tensions that can threaten to undermine efforts to address fragmentation-related inequalities in resources and segregation. One is the issue of mandates: much of the tensions in Omaha, as well as in Portland and Minneapolis, have revolved around the degree to which localities can be required to comply with policies designed to reduce segregation. Holme et al. (2011) found three problems in the implementation of this type of regionalism in Omaha. First, the integration goals that were set were intentionally weak in order to obtain political support from suburban districts resulting in minimal progress in that area. Second, while the election policy to the Learning Community Coordinating Council has been structured to increase the proportion of minorities in the coordinating council, so far the council lacks diversity. Third, this arrangement has suffered from a problem of political legitimacy: detractors of regionalism in Omaha have framed the regional governing board as an unnecessary layer of government, usurping local control.

CONCLUSIONS: LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Addressing fragmentation is clearly a challenging dilemma for local governments and school districts, yet without some type of policy intervention, levels of between-district segregation and tax base inequality are unlikely to diminish. Addressing segregation, furthermore, is important in terms of both instrumental aims (i.e., improved short- and long-term academic and social outcomes based upon historical segregation of opportunity for students of color) as well as moral and social justice rationales for integrated learning environments (Finnigan & Scarbrough, 2013).

Each of the policy efforts discussed in this article offer insights as to potential policy directions to improve integration and address the costs
of fragmentation. Our article suggests two central questions that policymakers concerned about these issues should consider. The first question is, What types of structures could serve as potential vehicles for cross-metro collaboration by school districts to address the problems of fragmentation? While policy choices that are available for addressing the problems of school district fragmentation are many, as illustrated in this article, they are not without their challenges. While annexation can help capture tax base and middle class flight, it is the least politically viable for addressing school district fragmentation and is rarely an option within the bounds of state law. The more commonly utilized option of consolidation helps to improve tax resources and create the potential for integration, yet has been politically difficult to attain with most successful efforts occurring in the South, given the lower levels of fragmentation that already exist. Furthermore, consolidation does not alleviate intra-district segregation and in many areas growth has been so great that middle-class families have moved outside the new boundaries, thereby increasing rather than decreasing fragmentation.

Mobility programs, including housing and inter-district mobility programs, offer a work-around to fragmentation by helping families and students move across boundary lines rather than removing these boundaries. The downside of such programs is that they are usually quite small, offering opportunity for a select few. Furthermore, most of these programs are one-way, moving students out of cities and into suburbs, thereby not supporting broader integration goals across the entire region.

Perhaps the most promising strategy, therefore, to minimize or limit the costs associated with fragmentation is cross-metro cooperation. To be effective, however, policy strategies must go beyond the limited arrangements, such as inter-local agreements to develop federated regionalist structures. Two existing arrangements may serve as vehicles for such structures: First are the Councils of Government (COGs) and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) that currently exist in most major metropolitan areas. To date, such structures have not typically focused on education or included representatives from school districts. However, they offer the advantage of pre-existing arrangements, as well as existing channels of communication, across metro areas. Bringing school districts into these pre-existing organizational structures could not only foster greater cross-district collaboration, it could also provide a mechanism for collaboration between cities and school districts, something that is relatively rare. The second type of structure that could serve as a potential model for regional collaboration among districts is the inter-district desegregation governing council. These councils are currently limited in
number (just eight in the country) but, given their focus on equity, might offer a framework for cross-metro cooperation across the country.

Our review of the literature indicates that important modifications to these existing structures must be made to significantly improve fiscal equity and diversity across school district boundary lines. First, our review suggests that such structures must be democratic and accountable: This means that the representatives should be directly elected, and representation on the councils should be proportional to the population. Structures to encourage and foster minority representation must be included as well. Second, such structures should seek to incorporate resource-sharing to reduce tax base inequality. Tax-base sharing structures, such as those instituted in the Twin Cities and in Omaha, offer advantages over school finance equalization. Such arrangements reduce the incentive for municipalities to engage in fiscal zoning (i.e., by zoning out low-income housing); guarantee that all districts will benefit when overall metropolitan growth is strong; and offer greater local control over resources through representation on the local governance councils (Orfield, 2002). Third, and equally important, regional governance structures should set regional goals for integration, and should hold school districts accountable for meeting such goals.

The second and more challenging question for policymakers is, How can regional cooperation between school districts be incentivized? One potential strategy, pushed by Orfield (2002), is to appeal to self-interest, helping school district officials (particularly in the urban core and inner-ring suburbs) to realize the ways in which their district is harmed by fragmentation and the benefits that they would accrue in greater regional cooperation (Orfield, 2002). Another potential strategy is the provision of incentives to encourage the cooperation and involvement of suburban school districts (see e.g., Wells et al., 2009). One possible source for incentives could be the federal government, which is currently using an incentive-based approach to stimulating educational reform in states and districts through the Race to the Top and Investing in Innovation programs. The federal government may also consider providing some exemptions to—or special provisions in—federal accountability requirements as an incentive for greater cooperation to improve cross-district diversity. The federal government may also incentivize coordination between COGs/MPOs and school districts.

While these federal strategies are important, state governments may have the most important role to play in regional coordination between school districts. Indeed, state legislation has been the source of the strongest regional efforts to date (in Portland, the Twin Cities, and Omaha).
State leaders often have the most to gain from strong metropolitan areas, particularly in terms of state economic growth, and many argue that regional coordination is required for strong overall economic growth (Drier et al., 2004; Orfield, 2002; Rusk, 1999). Through legislation allowing for these cooperative arrangements or through incentives that encourage efficiencies of regional coordination, while also explicitly targeting the reduction of school and district segregation, state leaders are in the position to address one of our most challenging problems facing our educational system today.

Ultimately, in the absence of greater cooperation, and given current demographic trends, it is likely that the problems related to school district fragmentation will grow. Such problems will likely be most severe for urban districts and inner-ring suburban districts in highly fragmented metropolitan areas in the North and Midwest, as these are the districts that are most likely to face increasingly high concentrations of need and declining resources (Orfield, 2002). Such challenges, left unaddressed, will make it more difficult for these districts to meet the increasing policy demands placed upon them.

Notes

1. The distinction between segregation and integration is important. We refer to segregation as the separation or isolation of students along racial and class lines into different settings, which may or may not be intentional or by design. We refer to integration as the intentional strategy to bring together students under conditions of equality and are grateful to Powell (2005) for his argument for “true integration” on which we base our understanding of integration as an inclusive educational system.

2. Thanks to Erica Frankenberg for drawing our attention to this point.


5. Frankenberg (2009), however, found that threats of school desegregation orders imposed on cities ultimately limited the ability of those cities to expand.


8. Over time, however, such efforts began to meet the resistance of suburban voters in many metro areas (Orfield, 2002). As Judd and Swanstrom (2000) note, voters rejected all but 17 of the 83 proposed government merger proposals between 1921 and 1979 (Judd & Swanstrom, 2000, p. 269).

10. wakeedpartnership.org

References


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